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Credit Crunch Caused Investment Slump?




The objective ofthis paperis to empirically analyze and qUantify the effectofchanges
in the supply ofbankcredit on private investment. Particularinterest is placed on the
role ofthe credit crunch in explaining the collapse in private investment in the early
1990s.
Using a vectorautoregressive econometric model, it is shown that the credit
supplyplays a statistically significant and economically important role indetermining
investment. The effect ofcredit on investment comes through with a lag ofabout a
year and persists for several years. Money supply is a powerful investment predictor
in a bivariate relation, but loses its significance completely once creditis includedin
the model. Hence, inthe"light ofhistory, it appears that the money supply has had little
effect oninvestment except as relayed through credit and, to a lesserextent, through
the interest rate. On the other hand, since strong contemporaneous comovements
were found between money and credit, the contemporaneous effect of money on
credit may beconsiderable. Ingeneral, the results were found to be consistent with the
credit view ofthe monetary transmission mechanism: monetary policy affects both
sides ofbank's balance sheets - money supply and credit supply - and credit seems
to be the more important predictorfor investment.
It is estimated that positive shocks to the credit supply during 1986-1988 raised
thepeak for private investment in 1990byabout FIM 25 billion annually. On the other
hand, the subsequent negative shocks deepened the collapse of investment by
approximately FIM 20 billion annually.
Tiivistelma
Tutkimuksessa analysoidaan empiirisesti pankkienluotontarjonnan muutosten vaiku-
tustayksityisiin investointeihin. Erityisesti kohdistetaan huomiotaluotonannon supis-
tumisen rooliin yksityisten investointien romahduksessa 1990-luvun alkuvuosina.
Tutkimuksessaosoitetaan vektoriautoregressivista ekonometrista mallia hyvaksi
kayttaen, etta luotontarjonnalla on tilastollisesti merkitsevaja taloudellisesti tarkea
vaikutus investointeihin. Luotontarjontavaikuttaa investointeihin noin vuoden viipeel-
la, javaikutus kestaauseita vuosia. Rahan maaraennustaahyvin investointejakahden
muuttujan mallissa, mutta sen ennustusvoimakatoaakaytfumossa taysin, kun malliin
lisatiliin luotontarjonta. Historian valossanayttaa sus silta, etta rahan tarjonta vaikuttaa
investointeihinlahes yksinomaan luotontarjonnan sekavahaisemmassamaarin korko-
jen kautta. Toisaalta pankkiluottojenjarahan mlliirful voimakas keskinilinen riippu-
vuus aikaperiodin sisalla antaa syyn uskoa, etta rahan tarjonnan vaikutus luottojen
maaraful saattaaollahuomattava. Tuloksien voidaan tulkitatukevan luotontarjonnan
roolia korostavaa nakemysta rahapolitiikan vaIittymisesta: rahapolitiikka vaikuttaa
pankkientaseiden molempiin puoliin- rahan roam-amjaluotontarjontaan- janmsta
kahdesta luotontarjonnalla nayttaa olevan suurempi vaikutus investointeihin.
Tulostenperusteellavoidaan arvioida, ettaluotontarjontaan vuosina 1986-1988
kohdistuneet positiiviset shokit lisasivat yksityisia investointeja huippuvuonna 1990
noin 25 miljardilla markalla. Vastaavasti luotontarjontaan myohemminkohdistuneet
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Inthe standard Keynesian/monetarist world, monetary policy affects the real economy
throughthe LM-relation. When money supply changes, the interest rate and aggregate
demand react so as to restore the equality ofmoney supply and dem~d. In such a
world, the only special role for the banking sector is to hold liquid deposits. 'On the
asset side, a bank is identical to any other agent inthe economy: it invests in bonds.
The assumption underlying this traditional view ofthe transmission mechanism
(the "money channel", or "money view") is that the fmancial system functions
smoothly. A debt contract is as easily made between a fmn and a household or
betweentwo firms as between a bankand a firm. Recent developments in the field of
financial microeconomics provide a variety ofreason why this may not be so, and why
it may be more efficient to use a financial intermediary, such as bank, insteadofdirect
"peer to peer" debt contracting.
Much as a result ofthese developments, the last decade or so has witnessed the
revival of an old and almost forgotten version of the monetary transmission
mechanism: the credit channel. The credit channel builds on the realization that for
important sectors ofthe economy, banks are the only source ofexternal financing.
Those sectors cannot offset a contraction in the banking sector's ability (or
willingness) to lend by issuing bonds. Ifmonetary policy affects banks' credit supply,
it also has a direct influence on those sectors' budget constraints and expenditures.
The credit channel and the money .channel are not alternatives, neither as
theoretical models nor as financial mechanisms. Rather, the two are complementary
to each other. In most cases, the credit channel works as an accelerator for the money
channel, and thereby amplifies the effects of monetary policy. The most common
versions ofthe credit channel depend on a functioning money channel to have any
effect at all.
The term credit channel comprises a number of distinct mechanisms. Gertler
(1993) labels the two most important ofthose the reserve requirement mechanism
and the balance sheet mechanism. The reserve requirement mechanism is -
somewhat confusingly-basedonthe banking sector's balance sheet identities. When
bank deposits decrease - because ofmonetary policy or for some other reason -
banks either have to increase borrowing from other sources or reduce lending. If
banks react even partly by reducing lending, then those customers who do not have
access to direct external funding have to cut their expenditures. This version ofthe
credit channel is often associated with the work ofBemanke and Blinder (1988).
The label "balance sheet mechanism" does not refer to the banking sector's
balance sheet but to the balance sheets of the borrowers. For many borrowers,
collateralis the most important determinant ofthe availability and terms ofbankloans.
When a tightening ofmonetary policy increases interest rates, it may induce a fall in
asset values, thus decreasing the value ofcollateral and weakening borrowers' balance
sheets. Consequently, bank loan availability decreases, which in turn gives a further
downward push to asset prices. As collateral values keep falling, the perceived risk
increases, and banks again tighten their collateral requirements. As the cycle continues
there may be a credit crunch and a flood ofbankruptcies .
The question ofthe relevance ofthe credit channel is basically an empirical one.
A great deal ofeconometric work has addressed this question. Most decisive is the
evidence provided by the cross section studies (see Kashyap and Stein, 1993, for a
7survey). There is little doubt that the credit channel works as theory suggests. Much
more problematic - and from the policy point ofview, much more interesting - is
how relevant is the creditchannel on the aggregate level.
The results ofeconometric studies using aggregate ..data are mixed. From the
studies using post World War II data, King (1986) finds little evidence of credit
having additional predictive powerfor GNP when measures ofmoney are included.
Instead, money was found to be a powerful output predictor. However, Bernanke
(1986) shows that once the correlations of the residuals are modeled as
contemporaneous interactions of the variables, credit plays an important role in
determining output- at least with the particularparametrization used byBemanke.
Anotherline ofliterature suggests that disruptions ofthe lending process can be quite
important. Forexample, the six-pointcreditrestraint programthat was inplace in the
USA for less than four months in 1980 had a remarkable effect on borrowing and
expenditure (see Schreft 1990 or Kashyap and Stein 1993 for details).
In this paper we use Finnish aggregate data to examine the comovements of
monetary aggregates with private investment. Specifically, we focus on the
dependence ofprivate investment on money and credit supply. This exercise does not
investigate the working of the credit channel per se, since it does not model the
dependence of monetary aggregates on monetary policy. The narrower question
addressed here is, whether bankcredit supply has an effect on investment over and
above the traditional money supply and interest rate variables. The causes of
movements in the credit supply are outside the scope ofthis paper and are a possible
avenue for future research.
2 Finnish financial development, boom, and bust
The estimation presented later covers the time span from the beginning ofthe 70s to
the present (second quarter of 1994). During this period, much has happened in the
Finnishfinancial system. Roughly the fIrst fifteen years ofthe estimation period were
an eraofcomprehensive rationing inthe financial markets. During most ofthat period,
rationing was effective and real interest rates were often considerably negative.
Rationing was gradually removed in the 80s. In all but the last two years of the
estimation period, the exchange rate was fixed, although subject to occasional
adjustment. Forthe last two years, the Finnish markkahas been floating.
Drastic changes in the Finnish economy have not been limited to institutional
changes. Most ofthe variation in most aggregate time series reflect the two recent
majortrends in the economy: rapid and accelerating growth during the 80s, a serious
overheating of the economy in the last years of the decade, and a collapse in the
beginning of the 90s. Although the timing of these trends corresponds to what
happened in the world economy, the amplitude ofthe cycle has been much greater
than what otherOEeD countries experienced.
LikeWise, the recent problems of the banking sector have been severe by
international standards. The collapse ofproperty prices and heavy credit losses hit the
Savings banks hardest, but all major banks have recorded heavy losses in the early
years ofthe 1990s. Public support for the banking sector is estimated to reach 10%
ofthe GNP.
8Figure 1 Private investment andbank loans
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1970 74 78 82 86 90 94
1 Private fixed investment Qeft axis)
2 Netincrease in bankloans (right axis)
The drastic nature of the changes is well depicted in Figure 1, which 'graphs
private fIXed investment and the change inbank loans to the private sector (both in
realterms). As can be seen, after peaking at the last turn ofthe decade, investment is
now at a lower level than in the beginning ofthe 70s, and bankloans have declined
four straight years. Foraneconometricianthe question is whether any stable statistical
relationship can survive such a stormy period.
There is little doubt that the recent collapse in investment and the decline inbank
credit are related phenomena. The question is then which one is driving the other:
does the decline inbankcredit merely reflect the fall inthe demand for credit, or is the
slump in investment due to the tightening ofbank credit and fmns' inability to raise
external funds? There is s9me evidence that the lattereffect has beenpresent
inrecent years. According to surveys and various informal sources, small and middle
sized frrms have indeed faced significant problems in obtaining bank loans. The
biggest roadblock seems to have beeninsufficient collateral; partly as a reaction to the
heavy credit losses, banks' collateral requirements have tightened at the same time as
propertyprices have plummeted. Inthe virtual absence ofnon-bank venture capitalist,
the scarcity of bank credit has presumably played an important role in reducing
investmentby small and middle sized fmns.
There are some indirect measures ofbankcredit tightening. Oneis banks' interest
margin. Figure 2 plots two measures ofthe margin. The frrst is based on the average
rate on new bank loans and the average rate on banks' liabilities. It shows how the
margin jumped from around four percentage points to almost six around 1986, and
then to seven at the turnofthe decade. The frrst jump was presumably demand driven.
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1 Average rate on newbank loans - average rate onbanks' liabilities
2 Avg. rate on newloans linked to 3 mth Helibor - 3 mth Helibor
Since the late 80s, banks' assets have been mostly linked to market interest rates,
whereas the bulk ofliabilities still consists oftax free deposits, on which the rates are
regulated. Therefore, this measure ofinterest margin is likely to reflect as much the
discrepancybetweenmarket rates and the regulated base rate as banks' willingness to
extend credit. The second series in the figure provides a more focused measure. It
plots the margin overthe three month interbankrate attached to bankloans linked to
that rate. The picture is much the same: an upward shift in the margin took place
around 1990. However, unlike the first measure, this margin has not shown any
tendency to shrinkinthe last two years.
Figure 3 Corporatebonds
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10Anotherconsequenceoftighterbankcredit shouldbe a fall inbankloans relative
to commercial paper. Figure 3 shows that this indeedhas beenthe case. Commercial
paper continued to grow for several years after bank loans began to decline. One
explanation for this observation is that banks may have convertedcompany loans to
commercialpaperin orderto circumventBIS capital requirements. This, however, is
not a complete explanation. Even after accounting for the increaseinbanks' holdings,
the commercialpaperissuedby[mns still show a definite upward trend. All in all, the
evidence seems to speakin favor ofa tightening ofbankcredit around 1990.
3 The data
The purposeofthis work is to study the dependence ofprivate fixed investment on
moneyand credit supply. To avoid having to impose a theoretical structure, the form
of which wouldbe anything butclear, and to sidestep problems ofsimultaneity, we
approachthe problemusing the unrestrictedVARmethodology. Needless to say, this
approach is not without problems of its own. First, it does not model any
contemporaneous interactions betweenvariables.Ifthe residual matrix is highly cross-
correlated, the residuals cannot be interpreted as genuine shocks to the respective
variables. Second, evenifa high degree ofdynamic interaction between variables is
found in the data, this cannot be interpreted as defInite evidenceofcausality unless all
relevant variables are included in the regression. Both problems are accounted for
shortly.!
Four variables are included: private fIXed investment (IN), money stock (M2),
bank loans to private sector (LOAN), and the interest rate on new bank loans
(LRATE). Priorto estimation, several problems had to be tackled. First, since private
fIXed investment is stated in real terms, the monetary aggregates needto be deflated
as well (to avoid expanding the model by including a price index). Forthis purpose,
the monetary aggregates were divided by the consumer price index. This poses a
potential problem by introducing a common source of variation in the series.
However, the results were checked to be very robust with respect to the handling of
inflation. The expectedreal interest rate on new bankloans was obtainedby adjusting
the nominal rate for expected next year inflation, the latter obtained from an
autoregressive forecast.
Foreigncurrencydenominated loans as a proportion ofbankloans to the private
sector, which was close to zero in the 70s, peaked at about one quarter in the
beginning ofthe 90s. Hence, the devaluation ofthe Finnish markka in 1991 and the
rapid depreciation following the start ofthe float in 1992 had a considerable impact on
the markkavalue ofthe loan stock. Since these changes carry no relation to eitherthe
1SeeLeamer (1985), Eichenbaum (1985) and Bernanke (1986) for a discussion ofthe problems in and
approaches to testing structural hypotheses using vectorautoregressions.
11supply ofordemand for credit, the effects ofexchange rate changes were removed
from LOAN.
2
. The last problem was one of differencing. The VAR methodology does not
assume stationarity of time series. On the contrary,._ differencing may cause
information loss by destroying possible cointegrating relations. However, the series
should be ofthe same order ofintegration. Table 1 gives the Augmented Dickey-
Fuller statistics for level ofIN and fIrst differences ofM2 and LOAN. Investment is
clearly seen to be 1(1). Forthe monetary aggregates, the result is mixed: for the fITst
difference of LOAN, the unit root hypothesis is readily accepted, but for the M2
difference, onlybarely. In fact, for given numberofparameters, the best fit is obtained
when LOAN is differenced and M2 is not. However, it makes little sense to assume
that the major components ofthe two sides ofbanks' balance sheets have different
orders of integration. Therefore, both M2 and LOAN were differenced before
estimation. The model was estimated also in levels; the changes in the results are
reported later.









Critical values: 5%=-1.944 1%=-2.589
4 Estimation results
4.1 Bivariate relations
First three bivariate VAR(4) models were estimated to test bivariate causality. The
results are presented in Table 2. A very strong causal relation appears to exist from
bothcredit and money to investment. Theeffect from credit is somewhat strongerbut
bothare significant at any common level ofsignificance. Investment does not seemto
have any effect on the fmancial aggregates. Credit seems to be only marginally
important in determining money and there is no indication ofreverse causality.
2This was done using a simple mechanical approach. The change in the markka value ofcurrency loans
due toexchangerate changes was approximated by (.6.E/Et-l) · CLOANt_ l, where E is the basketexchange
rateand CLOANis currencydenominated loans. Although this approach is by no means exact, itcaptures
the majorchanges (i.e. devaluations), and there is no reason to believe itto be biased.























Based on the same bivariate VAR models, Figure 2 plots the dynamic response
(impulse response) ofinvestment to a positive standard error shock in the fmancial
aggregates withtwo standard errorbounds. The two impulse responses are strikingly
similar: in both cases, the shock has a significant and persistentpositive effect on
investment. Together with the high correlation (0.54) between the residuals ofthe
fmancial aggregates, this leads one to conjecture that the impulses in the two have
common sources.
4.2 Full model results
The estimatedcoefficients withcorresponding t-values for the full VARX model (with
endogenous variables IN, LOAN, and M2, with four lags, and one lagged exogenous
variable LRATE) are reported in Table 3. As is typical for a VAR ofthis size, the
individual coefficients .tend to have low significance levels. Most of the one-step
variation ofIN is explained by its own history, although LOAN is also significant at
the 10 % level. The one-step variation inLOAN is explained by its own history only,
and not verywellbythat either. Surprisingly, the history ofM2 has only a slighteffect
onits ownoneperiod forecast and no effect on the others. Instead, LOAN explains a
significant part ofthe variation inM2.
















F-statistics and corresponding significance levels.
The interest rate variable RLOAN is significant at the system level. In the
investment equation it has a small butnegative coefficientthat is not quite significant
at the 5 % level. In the LOAN equation, the interest rate has a positive coefficient.
This is not as counterintuitive as may appear, since during credit rationing, increasing
the interest rate may well have an expansiveeffect.
There is no evidence of serious misspesification. The residuals seem to be
homoscedastic and exhibit no autocorrelation. The only test that gets a significant
value is the Chi-square normality test for the residuals of M2. Since the vector
normality test is not significant, we did not consider the problem serious.
The correlation matrix for the residuals reveals a mitigating result: there is
practically no correlation in the residuals between investment and the monetary
aggregates. Hence, simultaneitydoes not disturb the interpretation ofthe results here.
On the other hand, the residuals of LOAN and M2 are again correlated with a
coefficient of0.55. Obviously, someofthe correlation is due to deflating the nominal
series with the same deflator. However, as verified by experiments, even when using
nominal values, the residual correlation ofmoney and credit is still well over0.4. We
fmd this a natural result: shocks to the two sides ofbanks' balance sheets should be
correlated. One may interpret the correlation as an indicationofthe existenceofthe
credit channel: a shockto bank deposits limits, through the budget constraint, banks'
capacityto expand credit. On the otherhand, it may be that the shocks to the two are
simply causedby the same unmodeled factors. The interpretation ofthe correlation
does have some implications on the results, as is seen later.
Besides the important role ofcredit, a conspicuous feature in the results is the
nonexistent role ofmoney. Moneyhas no oneperiod forecasting power for investment
or credit and it performs only a little better in its own equation. One explanation for
this observation is that since liquidity affects investment through interest rates and
credit supply, which were both includedinthe model, there is no room left for money
to matter. The dataprovide some supportto this interpretation, as showninthe next
subsection.
144.3 Dynamic analysis
The results presented above are not very informative as such. Since a VAR model is
a reduced formrepresentationofan underlying structural datagenerating process and
the coefficients are highly complicated transformations ofthe structural parameters,
no economic interpretation canbe attached to the individual VARcoefficients. Even
the F-test for the significance of a variable in an individual equation is not very
interesting; fITst, because it only deals with one-step forecast power, and second,
because the effect of one variable on another is transmitted not only through the
particular equation, but through the whole system. Much more interesting are the
dynamic responses of the system to shocks in different variables, or the impulse
response functions. One canthinkofthe impulse response functions as measuring how
much the time path ofthe system changes, when the shock to a certain variable is
increased by one standarderror.
In orderto calculate the impulse responses, one needs to isolate the nature ofthe
shocks that drive the system. In essence, this means that one needs to impose a
contemporaneous structure on the model. Ifthe residuals ofthe model are not cross-
correlated, this does not pose a problem; no contemporaneous effects exist and the
residuals describe genuine shocks to the particular variable. However, when the
residuals are cross-correlated, one faces the same problem of simultaneity as in
structuralmodels. The questionis, does the correlation reflect a contemporaneous link
from one variable to another, or do the shocks merely share commoncauses.
As mentioned above, the probleminthe presentestimation is the highcorrelation
between the residuals ofmoney and credit. Whether one assumes the correlation to
originate from a contemporaneous effect from money to credit or vice versa, has a
significant effect on the outcome. On the other hand, since the residuals of the
investment equation are not correlated with the residuals ofthe financial aggregates,
the effects ofcredit and money on investment (and vice versa) are quite robust with
respect to the choice oforthogonalization.
As a reference case, Figure 4 plots the impulse responses calculated from the
unorthogonalized covariance matrix, in which the contemporaneous correlations are
not modeled. Each impulse response is again plotted with two standard error limits
obtained by Monte Carlo simulation. It is seen inFigure 4 that a shockin investment
has some persistence - leveling offin about four years - but it has little dynamic
effect on the monetary aggregates. Money seems to have a small and statistically
insignificant positive impact on investment and little effect on anything else.
A shockin bankloans, on the otherhand, has a large and statistically significant
positive effect on investment, with a persistence of about seven years. A positive
shock increases the loan supply for four or five years, after which a slight backlash
may occur. The reaction ofinvestment peaks at about two or three years after the
initial shock; at that point, a positive initial shock of one standard error in credit
(about 1.5% ofthe credit aggregate) has increased investmentby four percent.
Next the residuals were orthogonalized using the Choleski decomposition in the
order IN, M2, and LOAN. In other words, a recursive structure was imposed on the
contemporaneous effects between the variables, such that shocks in investment affect
money andcredit in the same period, and shocks in money, in tum, affect credit within
the period. Thechoice to put M2first reflects the mechanismsuggestedby the reserve
requirement version ofthe credit channel: changes in money, through balance sheet
identities, force banks to cut their lending.
15Table 3 Fullmodelestimates using quarterly data 1971:2-1994:2
Dependent variable
IN LOAN M2
IN(-1) 0.3687 0.0450 0.0202
(-3.556**) (-1.647) (0.698)
IN(-2) -0.0579 -0.0081 -0.0198
(-0.518) (-0.276) (-0.630)
IN(-3) 0.0956 -0.0170 0.0170
(0.854) (-0.577) (0.543)
IN(-4) 0.4331 -0.0229 -0.0614
(4.033**) (-0.810) (-2.042*)
LOAN(-l) 0.4198 0.326 0.1381
(0.836) (2.462*) (0.982)
LOAN(-2) 0.9192 0.1746 0.2778
(1.768) (1.274) (1.908)
LOAN(-3) 0.5813 -0.0179 0.1910
(1.058) (-0.124) (1.241)
LOAN(-4) 0.4996 0.1854 -0.1892
(0.964) (1.358) (-1.304)
M2(-1) 0.5774 0.0954 0.0240
(1.200) (0.752) (0.178)
M2(-2) 0.2884 0.0835 -0.2309
(0.580) (0.637) (-1.658)
M2(-3) -0.1073 0.0317 -0.0985
(-0.215) (0.241) (-0.707)
M2(-4) 0.5328 0.1006 0.1150
(1.089) (0.780) (0.840)
RLOAN(-l) -0.4077 -0.0249 0.1432
(-1.861) (-0.431) (2.334*)
SEAS(-I) -0.1933 -0.0199 -0.0728
(-3.103**) (-1.212) (-4.174**)
SEAS(-2) -0.1030 -0.0018 -0.0357
(-1.862) (-0.124) (-2.307*)
SEAS(-3) -0.0661 0.0064 -0.0602
(-1.024) (0.375) (-3.333**)
CONST 1.6866 0.0357 0.4908
(2.367*) (0.190) (2.460*)
Std. error 0.056 0.015 0.016
Adjusted R
2 0.918 0.578 0.675
AR 1-5, F(5
1
71) 1.335 0.724 0.347
Normality, X (2) 2.517 5.47 14.0**
ARCH(4), F(4,68) 1.296 0.594 0.078
Xi
2
, F(26,49) 0.596 1.003 0.867
.F-tests for significance
IN 38.70** 0.87 2.03
LOAN 2.13 2.88* 2.50*
M2 0.72 0.29 1.39





t-values in parentheses, *=significant 5 %, ** =significant 1 %.
16Figure 4 Impulse responses ofthe unorthogonalized model
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quarters quarters quartersThe picture changes quite a bit, as depicted in Figure 4. A shockinLOAN still
has a large and significant effect on investment, but now money also affects
investment. Actually, it can be observed that a shock in money is mostly relayed
throughthe credit supply, whichreacts to a shockin money.almost exactly as it reacts
to its own shock. A noteworthy feature is that credit still maintains its significance
after part of its residual variance is attributed to shocks in money. This can be
interpreted as animplicationofthe existence ofstrong autonomous innovations in the
credit supply.
It was hypothesized in the previous section thatthe insignificant role ofmoney
may be explainedby the inclusionofits main working channels, namely the interest
rate and credit. Thedataprovide at leastpartial support for this hypotheses. Although
the exclusion ofthe interest rate neither adds to nor diminishes the role ofmoney,
dropping credit from the model has a dramatic effect on the relationship between
money and investment. As shown in section 4.1, in a bivariate model ofmoney and
investment, money has a strong, persistent, and statistically significant effect on
investment. The dynamic profile ofthat effect is very much like what was observed
from credit to investment in the complete model, except that here money is strongly
significant also in short term forecasts. Once credit is included, this effect disappears
completely. We fmd these results broadly consistent with the hypothesized operation
ofthe creditchannel: changes inM2 affect credit supply and thereby investment.
4.4 Sensitivity analysis and structural stability
To test the stability ofthe system, the model was estimated over two subsamples:
71:2-88:2, and 77:2-94:2. Figure 5 plots the (unorthogonalized) impulse responses
ofinvestmentto creditin these cases.
Dropping six years from the estimation period severely reduces the degrees of
freedom, so it comes as no surprise that the standard errors are somewhat wider. For
the latter subsample the picture is very similarto the whole sample. The role ofcredit
in explaining investment is slightly strongerthan in the whole sample, butmoney loses
its effect altogether. Forthe earlier subsample the picture changes a bit more. The
effectofcredit on investment appears less pronouncedthan when estimated from the
whole sample. The one-step forecast power of credit in the investment equation
actually increases: credit is now significant at the 1% level. Thereason for the smaller
dynamic response ofinvestment is twofold. First, as is clearly visible from Figure 1,
the persistence ofthe credit supply (new bankloans) increases significantly after credit
rationing, that is, around 1986. Before that year, credit supply looks like a stationary
series. Excluding the last six years significantly reduces the estimated persistence of
credit shocks, which is reflected in the less persistent reaction ofinvestment. Second,
the standard error shockin credit, which is used as the seedinthe simulation, is much
smallerinthe earlierperiod (0.0089 versus 0.0121 inthe latter subsample). For shocks
19ofequal size, the two dynamic responses would look much more similar, at least in the
short and mediumrun.3
Altogether, we may conclude that even though there is evidence ofan increase in
the persistence of credit shocks, the effect of credit on.investment is robust with
respect to the estimation period - even surprisingly so, considering the dramatic
changes that have taken place inthe environment.
Figure 5 Impulse responses ofinvestment to a
shock in credit in thesubsamples
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The effect ofdeflating was examined by running the regression using nominal
instead ofreal variables. This provedto have almost no effect on the results. The most
pronounced change was that the residual correlation between investment and credit
more than doubled to about 0.25. Finally, the model was estimated with real
investment, nominal fmancial aggregates, and price level as variables. Again, the
results were essentially-unchanged.
3 The VAR model was tested for a structural break at 83:2 (the midpoint of the sample) in the
coefficients ofLOAN. The test value was statistically significant at the five per cent level (Che[12]
statisticgets the value 24.7). However, the structural break appears to take place only in the time series
process ofthefmancial aggregates. There was no evidence ofa change in the dependence ofinvestment
on credit.
20The picture changes more dramatically when the estimation is done without
differencing the monetary aggregates.
4 The estimated model has an exploding cycle
with a frequency ofabout nine years. The amplitude ofthe cycle roughly doubles with
each cycle. Credit maintains - and strengthens - its positive short term effect on
investment, but money gets some forecast power as well. The strong cyclical
properties ofthe model take over quickly after a few quarters, so no conclusions can
be made about the impulse responses. Since we find this description - exploding
cycle- ofthe time series properties ofthe variables counterintuitive and implausible,
and also because the results were much more sensitive to changes in the estimation
period than in the differenced version - in particular to the exclusion ofthe last five
years - the differenced model was maintained.
As mentioned above, the fact that credit supply precedes investment does not
necessarily mean that credit supply causes investment. It may be that there is a third
variable, or ~set ofvariables, which causeboth credit supply and investment, and that
credit supplyjustreacts faster than investment. This problemis inherent to all vector
autoregressions: In order to make defInite conclusions about causal inference, one
would need to control for an infeasibly large set ofpossible causal variables.
Within the limits offeasibility and data availability, we checked the robustness of
the credit-investment relationship withrespect to the inclusion ofpossible background
variables. Four regressions were run, with the log of GNP, the number of
bankruptcies, and the logs orreal housing prices and real stockprices, eachincluded
in turn. In the first two cases, the results ofthe baseline regression remained intact,
and the additional variable had a negligible contribution over the original variables. On
the other hand, housing prices seem to play a significant role in determining
investment. A shock in the price ofhousing seems to persist about four years and to
cause a significant positive effectofsimilar length oninvestment. A similarbutless
pronounced effect was found from stock prices to investment. Most importantly,
however, the relations between the three original variables were hardly affected by
adding the new variable: in particular, credit supply in each case maintains its
persistent and significant effect on investment, with essentially unchanged magnitude.
All in al, no evidence was found against interpreting the relationship between credit
supply and investment as a causal relationship.
5 Credit crunch and investment slump
The question we ask in this section is the following: To what extent can the recent
swings in investmentbe explainedbychanges in credit supply? In otherwords, what
would the path of investment have been without shocks to the credit supply. To
answer this question, a series ofin-sample simulations were run with the VARmodel
estimated above. In each simulation, the actual value ofthe exogenous variable (loan
rate) was used. The residuals of the VAR model were fed in as shocks to the
investment and money equations, but no shocks were fed into the credit equation.
4Particularlyimportant question is whether or not to difference LOAN. The impact ofdifferencing M2 is
negligible.
21There are some caveats with this approach. First, the high residual correlation
between credit and money hampers the interpretation ofthe results. By forcing the
shocks in credit to zero while keeping the shocks in money unchanged one clearly
disregards an unmodeled structuralfeature ofthe process. H:owever, without knowing
the true structure, there is no clear avenue for handling this problem. Also, since the
autonomous effect ofmoney is quite small, ignoring the correlation should not have
a majoreffect on the result.
Next, even with orthogonal shocks, it would not be perfectly clear how the
results should be interpreted. Credit shocks are, ofcourse, not a series of isolated
events in the economy. They reflect changes in the situation ofthe financial market,
changes which no doubt also affect the shocks to money and investment. Minimally,
one would expect that changing the path ofcredit supply would also change the path
ofthe loan rate.
Finally, the simulated paths do not pretendto represent feasible paths that might
have been attained with another economic policy. Rather, they try to isolate the role
ofthe credit supplyby estimating what would have happened inthe (most likely quite
unrealistic) case that banks had somehow managed to keep their credit supply
unchanged regardless of credit losses, capital requirements, and falling property
prices. When interpreting the results, one should bear in mind that forcing credit
shocks to zero does not mean fixing the quantity ofcredit. Credit is still very much
endogenous inthe simulation. However, we assume that shocks to the system affect
credit only through the other variables in the system. Ofcourse, in addition to the
shocks, credit (as well as other endogenous variables) is also driven by the time series
properties ofthe system, which tends toward its steady state path.
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All this said, the results appear to be quite illuminating. Figure 7 plots the actual
private fixed investment and the simulated values from three simulations starting with
1986:3, 1989:1, and 1990:3. The starting point ofthe fITst simulation is chosen as to
predate the boomofthe late 80s. Figure 7 shows that without the positive exogenous
22shocks to the credit supplythat tookplace inperiod 1986-1988, the investmentboom
wouldhave been almost nonexistent. Annual investmentwould have peakedin 1989
at only FIM 118.5 billion instead of the actual FIM 145.1 billion. From 1990 on,
investmentwould have declinedbutnot by quite as much.as it actually did.
The second starting point (1989:1) was chosen because it was the pointwhen the
series of negative shocks to the credit supply started to appear.
5 If none of the
succeeding shocks had arrived, investment would have peaked much higher (at over
FIM 160 billion annually). The downturn again would have been steep, but annual
investment would have stayed about FIM 20 billion above the actual rate of
investment.
Finally, the last starting point (1990:3) is where the boomended and the free fall
began. Interestingly, it appears that shocks to the credit supply after that date playa
minor role in determining investment. Had credit supply stayed at the level it was at
the begimllng of1990, annualinvestmentin 1993 would have beenhigherby less than
FIM 9 billion.
The paths simulated for Figure 7 are point estimates. It is not quite straight-
forward to a choose measureofuncertainty to attach to them. There are two kinds of
uncertainties that can be calculated for the simulations. First, there is the uncertainty
related to the parameterestimates. Ifthe shocks to the system are known, then this is
the only source ofuncertainty. In the impulse response simulations presented above,
this was the type of uncertainty represented by the confidence intervals. It is the
correctmeasure, because an impulse response measures the effect ofa given shock on
the endogenous variables. However, when one wants to measure the effectofactual
shocks that took place during a periodoftime in history, one faces another source of
uncertainty: we do not observe the actual shocks. Instead, we observe the variables,
from which the shocks have to be estimated. Hence, to give a full picture of the
uncertainties involved inthe exercise, we must also take into account the uncertainty
connected with the estimationofthe shocks.
Figure 8 provides measuresofthese two kinds ofuncertainties for the simulation
starting from 1989:1 (that is, for series 3 inFigure 7). It plots the deviation inprivate
investment caused by shocks to the credit supply, together with two sets of
approximately 95% confidence intervals (two standarderrorlimits). The solid line is
the point estimate ofthe deviation. It corresponds to the difference between actual
private investment and the one simulated in Figure 7, series 3. The narrower limits
marked by the dashed lines (marked with number 2) are the confidence interval for
the case that the estimated shocks are the true exogenous shocks that hit the credit
supply. The confidence intervalis relatively wide, buteventhe upperbound stays well
below zero overthewholeperiod. Using these intervals, the most defmite effectofthe
credit crunch on investment took place during the year 1991, when it reduced
investment by approximately FIM 20 billion, with the confidence interval extending
from AM 10 billion FIM 30billion.
5Thefirst exogenous shock that hit the market was the creditrestraint program imposed on the banks
by the BankofFinland. The program introduced a progressive cash reserve requirement, in which the
reserve ratio depended on the rate ofcredit expansion.
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Figure 8 Cumulative effectofcreditshockson privateinvestment
since 1989:1
FIM billion, 1990 prices
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The wider confidence intervals (dotted line, marked 3) include the uncertainty
involved in having to estimate the shocks. To produce these limits parameters were
drawn from their distribution, and for each set of parameters, the corresponding
estimates of credit shocks were used as the input to the system.
6 The result is
noticeably wider confidence intervals. According to these estimates, it appears
reasonably certain that during years 1990 and 1991 credit supply constrained
investment. However, although it seems likely that the same continuedto betrue for
anotheryear ortwo, one cannotrule out the possibility that the effect was zero. The
closer we come to the endofthe estimation period, the less definite the conclusions
we can draw.
It is worthnoting that the estimatedrole ofcreditin the recentinvestment slump
is quite robust to changes inthe estimationperiod. Forexample, while the time series
properties ofcredit look very different in the subsample 1971:2 - 1988:2, and the
impulse response ofinvestment to changesincreditis much smaller (see figure 5), the
estimated effect of credit on investment during the last five years is statistically
significant and actually even stronger than the effect estimated from the full sample.
The reason is that the estimated credit shocks for the simulation period, calculated
using the parametervalues estimated from the early subperiod, are negative and much
greater (in absolute value) than those obtained with the full sample parameters. This
more than compensates for the shorterpersistence ofthose shocks.
~Moreprecisely, foreachdraw ofthe parameter vetor ~, the corresponding residuals were calculated as
Ut=Yt-Xt~·
246 Conclusions
The results can be interpreted as broadly consistent with the credit view of the
transmission ofmonetary policy. The complete mechanism ofthe credit channel-
from monetarypolicythroughbankbalance sheets to investment and consumption-
was not tested. Considering the recentregime shifts in monetary policy and'several
structural changes in the Finnish financial markets, the prospects for such a broad-
based approach are not promising. Instead, the analysis concentratedon the lastlink
ofthe credit channel, namely, the linkfrom credit supply to investment. This linkwas
found to be statistically significant. A positive credit shock has a strong and lasting
positive impact on investment. This relation was found to be reasonably stable over
time, even with respect to the recent pronounced changes in the Finnish fmancial
markets. Itwas also found to be invariant with respect to the inclusion ofadditional
variables.
Based on the results, it seems reasonably clear that shocks to monetary
aggregates (Granger) cause changes ininvestment. The question ofhow these shocks
are set offleaves more room for debate. Dynamic analysis provides some indication
of credit causing money but no evidence of the reverse causality. However, the
contemporaneous correlation between the residuals from the credit and money
equations was quite high, so a shockto the money supply may affect the credit supply
veryquickly. Ifthis is the case, then the results can be interpreted as being consistent
with, ifnot providing direct evidence of, the reserve requirement version ofthe credit
channel: banks react to disturbances inthe money supply partly with a sudden'cut in
lending. This interpretation is, ofcourse, not the only one possible. Perhaps banks
react to a tightening of monetary policy by cutting lending, which reduces money
demand.
Fundamentally, the question whether money causes credit or vice versa is
somewhat contrived: both are endogenous variables that reflect the reactions ofthe
financial systemto exogenous variables. It is only natural that the two sides ofbanks'
balance sheets react symmetrically to changes in those exogenous variables. Fromthe
monetary policy point of view it would be interesting to know how important
monetary policy is as such an exogenous variable. Unfortunately, since the purpose
ofthis paperis to examine the role ofmoneyand creditindetermining investment, and
not to test the whole chain ofcausality in the monetary transmission mechanismfrom
central bank actions to domestic demand, the analysis offers little scope for such
policy conclusions. Still, there is little doubt that factors otherthan monetary policy
have strongly affected'credit supply. Most importantly, the plummeting ofproperty
prices and the resulting heavycredit losses caused severe bankcapital problems. Inthe
last few years the banks have slipped dangerously close to the BIS capital requirement
and, without government money, would possibly have breached it. As the perceived
riskiness ofthe economic situation increased and the banking sector's willingness to
carry those risks diminished, the result was tight restraints on credit expansion and a
sharp rise incollateral requirements.
Thecentralfinding ofthe analysis was that inthe lightofhistory, credit matters,
and there is no evidence ofits importance being on the wane. Hence, ifnothing else,
the analysis indicates that, at least in Finland, a central bankerwouldbe well advised
to keep creditin the list ofinformation variables.
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